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TEACHING TREATIES:
TREATY ABROGATION AND THE RULE
AGAINST PERPETUITIES:
SEVENTEEN QUOTATIONS AND TWO GRAPHS
TO GET STUDENTS TALKING
ROBERT LAURENCE*

Preliminary Commentary
This is me. What you read following each quotation or graph is my
commentary upon the material that I present to my students, via handouts,
as we study Indian treaties.
To begin with, unlike most of the other Indian law courses discussed at
this Symposium, in mine—taught in a state without Indian Country, and to
an audience almost entirely non-Indian—it is important to begin nonhistorically and not with the Marshall Trilogy, as discussed elsewhere in
these pages. My students need to see on the very first day of class an Indian
tribe as a modern functioning government. So, at the outset of the semester
we spend about three or four hours discussing a case called United States v.
Ant,1 which is a largely uncommented-upon case involving the federal
prosecution of a tribal member who has already been convicted, without
having been Miranda-ized, before the tribal court. Ant introduces my
students to tribes as governments, and it also serves very nicely as a way of
setting forth what I call the seven basic principles of the entire course.2 One
of those principles, little involved in Ant itself, is the existence,
enforceability, and abrogability of Indian treaties.
Leaving these seven principles aside, we then plunge into a careful and
wide-ranging discussion of the concept of tribal, state, and national
sovereignty, and of the plenary power of Congress over the tribes. You
might see, for example, an obscure article in the Tulsa Law Review.3 When
we return near mid-semester to the direct study of treaties, the assignment
*

Robert A. Leflar Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
1. 882 F.2d 1389 (9th Cir. 1988).
2. See generally Robert Laurence, The Basic Principles of American Law as They Apply to
American Indian Tribes, 5 Y.B. N.Z. JURISPRUDENCE 35 (2003).
3. Robert Laurence, Don’t Think of a Hippopotamus: An Essay on First Year-Contracts,
Earthquake Prediction, Gun Control in Baghdad, the Indian Civil Rights Act, the Clean Water
Act, and Justice Thomas’s Separate Opinion in United States v. Lara, 40 TULSA L. REV. 137
(2004).
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for class is the Dion case, but, as class begins, and without mentioning
either the assignment or Indian treaties, I put the Rule Against Perpetuities
(RAP) on the floor.
And, with that introduction, my nineteen quotations and two graphs
follow.
I.
“No interest in property is good unless it must vest, if at all, within 21
years following a life or lives-in-being at the creation of the estate.”4
Commentary
The Rule Against Perpetuities is not usually among the most-loved
recollections of the first-year property course for most upper-class students.
Getting this statement out of them is a little like tooth-pulling, and here in
Indian law, I am not practicing that kind of dentistry, worthy though it
might be in other circumstances. After a couple of good-faith efforts, I
stand ready to lay the RAP upon them.
II.
“A person may control the use and disposition of his or her property
for only a relatively short period of time after his or her death.”5
Commentary
Of more use for present purposes than the bar-exam RAP, is a
statement like this one, which goes to the essence of the rule, leaving out
most of the detail. It is easiest to get this kind of plain-language translation
out of the students if there is a non-law student in the class, as there is in
mine occasionally, but not regularly. Just ask the law students to explain
the RAP to the present (or an imagined) intelligent non-law student. A
statement such as this one—designed for discussion by non-lawyers, but not
for bar-exam use—captures the essential policy conflict presented by the
RAP. On one side, we have the interests of the “Dead Hand,” that is to say
the desire of property owners to control the property they own and to
4. This is a traditional statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities, whose origins lie in The
Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 3 Ch. Cas. 1, 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (1682).
5. This is a statement of the Rule Against Perpetuities as it might be explained to an
intelligent non-lawyer.
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determine future owners even after they are dead.6 On the other side is the
“Living Hand,” the understandable inclination of the living to think that
they are the ones who best know how property should be used, and to think
that the dead should be content simply to be dead.
III.
“Great nations, like great men, must keep their word. When America
says something, America means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a
vow made on marble steps.”7
IV.
“Last week we conducted another promising test of our missile defense
technology. For the good of peace, we’re moving forward with an active
program to determine what works and what does not work. In order to do
so, we must move beyond the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a treaty
that was written in a different era for a different enemy. America and our
allies must not be bound to the past. We must be able to build the defenses
we need against the enemies of the 21st century.”8
Commentary
These two statements by the George Bushes, perè et fils, capture as
nicely as any the conflict to which the Rule Against Perpetuities is the
compromise, now with respect to treaties and not property rights. (If
there’s a difference. Justice Thomas has suggested that there isn’t).9
President Bush, perè, here represents the interests of the Dead Hand and the
idea that promises, once made, should be kept. His inaugural comment is

6. For a nice fictional rendition of this desire, written so as to question the wisdom of the
Dead Hand, see Nevil Shute’s 1950 book, The Legacy, which was made into the film A Town Like
Alice. For a real-life battle, here stated passionately in support of the Dead Hand, see Hilton
Kramer, Looting Dr. Barnes: Philly Plutocrats Plunder a Legacy, N.Y. OBSERVER, Oct. 13, 2003,
(Arts & Entertainment) at 1.
7. President George H.W. Bush, Inaugural Address, 1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF GEORGE BUSH 1, 3
(Jan. 20, 1989). See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J., dissenting) (“Great nations, like great men, should keep their word. When America
says something, America means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a vow made on marble
steps.”) (emphasis added). President Bush substituted “must” for Justice Black’s “should” in the
first sentence.
8. President George W. Bush, Remarks at The Citadel, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1500, 1504 (Dec. 11,
2001) available at 2001 WL 1571476 (F.D.C.H.).
9. See Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 220 (1999)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
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especially apt in Indian law, of course, as he is quoting (almost) from
Justice Black’s famous dissent in the Tuscarora case, (which everyone,
including me, needs to remember was not a treaty case).
President Bush, fils, here takes the position that times change in ways
unanticipated by those who crafted the exchange of promises that is called a
treaty, and the living are the ones in the best position to decide what the
present rules should be, not those who are dead, retired, out-of-the-loop, or
unelected.
V.
“The message from this Administration, from those of us up here today,
is this: You should keep the promises you make to your workers. If you
offer a private pension plan to your employees, you have a duty to set aside
enough money now so your workers will get what they’ve been promised
when they retire.”10
VI.
“Delta Air Lines’ lawyer said a bankruptcy judge will be playing
‘Russian roulette’ with the company’s future if he denies its motion to
terminate a traditional pension plan for pilots. Scuttling the plan for
thousands of retired pilots is ‘horrible,’ Delta lawyer Marshall Huebner
said Friday in a court hearing on the issue, ‘but the simple thing is that
Delta will not survive unless the plan is terminated.’ In a preview of the
arguments U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Adlai Hardin will hear, one group of
retired pilots opposed Delta’s move, saying the airline is exaggerating the
risks of keeping the plan. Another retired pilot group said termination is
probably necessary, and the airline’s creditors said there’s no other way to
save the company.”11
Commentary
Now here in the first of these two quotations we have the present
President Bush following his father’s lead and emphasizing the sanctity of
promises. Which is not to say that he necessarily disagrees with the
position of Delta’s management—now as Debtor-in-Possession in the
bankruptcy proceeding—that the deal originally promised to the now10. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Signing of The Pension Protection Act of
2006 (Aug. 17, 2006) 2006 WL 2375038 (F.D.C.H.).
11. Russell Grantham, First Salvos Fired in Delta Battle, ATLANTA J.-CONSTITUTION, Sept.
2, 2006, at 1B.
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retired pilots must be undone by one side acting alone. As is often the case,
the battle between the Dead and Living Hands—or here the Debtor-inPossession and the Retirees—is a difficult one to manage, as Delta’s lawyer
clearly expresses. That the retired pilots are themselves conflicted shows
the difficulty of the issue, as, in fact, does the Pension Protection Act of
2006, which inter alia, provides a governmental insurance policy to protect
the retirees of defaulting pension providers. The Rule Against Perpetuities
is complicated exactly because it needs to be.
VII.
“A covenant marriage is a marriage entered into by one (1) male and
one (1) female who understand and agree that the marriage between them
is a lifelong relationship . . . . Only when there has been a complete and
total breach of the marital covenant commitment may a party seek a
declaration that the marriage is no longer legally recognized.”12
Commentary
When it comes to the keeping, or not, of out-of-date promises, twentyfirst century America’s best example, of course, is divorce. The “great
men” of George Bush, perè, and Justice Black, are doing a rather poor job
lately maintaining the vows of marriage, but who, exactly, would return to
the days before Henry VIII? A compromise position is the so-called
“covenant marriage,” where the parties are permitted voluntarily to bind
themselves to a more restrictive divorce regimen, and, once having chosen
that route, may not then voluntarily undo the choice, and opt back into a
more liberal regimen, even if that is the desire of both parties, as the
marriage begins to unwind. Anecdotally, it appears that covenant marriage
is more popular among 50-somethings, re-committing themselves to an
already comfortable relationship, than among 20-somethings, about to
embark upon the peculiar undertaking we call marriage.13

12. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-803(a)(1), (3) (2006). See generally Chauncey E. Brummer,
The Shackles of Covenant Marriage: Who Holds the Keys to Wedlock?, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 261 (2003).
13. See David Holman, A New Covenant, AM. SPECTATOR ONLINE, Mar. 4, 2005 (on file
with author).
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VIII.
“We must presume that Congress acted in perfect good faith in the
dealings with the Indians of which complaint is made, and that the legislative branch of the government exercised its best judgment in the premises.
In any event, as Congress possessed full power in the matter, the judiciary
cannot question or inquire into the motives which prompted the enactment
of this legislation. If injury was occasioned, which we do not wish to be
understood as implying, by the use made by Congress of its power, relief
must be sought by an appeal to that body for redress and not to the courts.
The legislation in question was constitutional, and the demurrer to the bill
was therefore rightly sustained.”14
Commentary
So finally we come to Lone Wolf, which famously held that Indian
treaties are abrogable by one side acting alone, or, more precisely, that it
was not a violation of constitutional due process for the United States to
walk away from the obligations of an Indian treaty. The case is dreadfully
written, full of early twentieth century racist rhetoric, but its result is almost
unremarkable, when it is related back to Presidents Bush, perè et fils, the
Rule Against Perpetuities, and the Dead versus Living Hand. At least put it
this way: it would have been extraordinarily protective of the Dead Hand
had the Supreme Court enjoined the abrogation of treaty by the Executive,
and held that the only way treaty obligations could be changed would be by
re-negotiating the treaty and re-submitting it to the Senate for ratification.

14. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903).
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IX.
THE WHITE HOUSE
February 28, 2005
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUBJECT: Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of
Justice in Avena
The United States is a party to the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (the ‘Convention’) and the Convention’s Optional Protocol
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol),
which gives the International Court of Justice (ICJ) jurisdiction to decide
disputes concerning the “interpretation and application” of the
Convention.
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President
by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the
United States will discharge its inter-national obligations under the
decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America)
(Avena), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give effect to the
decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by
the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision.
George W. Bush 15
Commentary
The earlier quotation of Bush, fils, on the ABM treaty necessarily
raises the issue of whether the same rules apply, and whether the same compromises should be made, regarding international treaties. I am interested
here in the treatment of international treaties under domestic American law,
and not their treatment under international law, about which I am both
largely ignorant and largely unconcerned. This quotation, showing the
President’s artful resolution of the compromise regarding the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, and his subsequent withdrawal from the
optional protocol of the Convention, shows the complexity of the issue.

15. George W. Bush, Compliance with the Decision of the International Court of Justice in
Avena (Feb. 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/
20050228-18.html.
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Adam Ereli, a spokesman for both the Department of State and for the
Living Hand, explained the determination this way:
[W]hen we signed up to the optional protocol, it [was] not
anticipated that . . .cases . . .would be referred to the [International
Court of Justice] [or that] the optional protocol would be used to
review cases of domestic criminal law. This is a development,
frankly, that we had not anticipated in signing up to the optional
protocol . . . .16
X.
“[T]he question whether a particular measure was appropriate for
protecting and advancing the tribe’s interests, and therefore not subject to
the constitutional command of the Just Compensation Clause, is factual in
nature. The answer must be based on a consideration of all the evidence
presented. We do not mean to imply that a reviewing court is to secondguess, from the perspective of hindsight, a legislative judgment that a
particular measure would serve the best interests of the tribe. We do mean
to require courts, in considering whether a particular congressional action
was taken in pursuance of Congress’ power to manage and control tribal
lands for the Indians’ welfare, to engage in a thoroughgoing and impartial
examination of the historical record. A presumption of congressional good
faith cannot serve to advance such an inquiry.”17
Commentary
It is not too soon to note that some—perhaps many—treaty abrogations
are compensable. Sioux Nation is seen to be directly connected to the
suggestion given by the Supreme Court in Lone Wolf, as the later Court
agreed with the earlier one that complaints regarding treaty abrogations
should be taken to the Congress, or, in this case, to the Claims Court, set up
by Congress to hear complaints for money damages against the United
States.18

16. State Dep’t Regular Briefing, (Mar. 10, 2005), available at 2005 WL 555679 (F.D.C.H.)
17. United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415-16 (1980).
18. See id.
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XI.
“It must always be remembered that the various Indian tribes were
once independent and sovereign nations, and their claim to sovereignty
long predates that of our own Government.”19
Commentary
At some point in this discussion—perhaps here, perhaps earlier;
perhaps via a student’s observation, perhaps via my direct question—the
difference between Indian treaties and individual property rights will
become plain, and will thereby tie our discussion of treaties back into the
earlier discussion—and the dominant theme of the entire course—of tribal
sovereignty. Because of the corporate existence of both the tribes and the
United States, the parties to a treaty are with us still. Neither being dead,
there is no occasion for the operation of the Dead Hand. Technically, at
least.
Unless one thinks, however, that the choice between Presidents Bush,
perè et fils, is easy and clear, the doctrine of tribal sovereignty does not
solve the question of the abrogability of treaties, but only makes it more
complex.
An additional complexity with respect to Indian treaties is that treatymaking ended in 1871.20 I had long assumed that this Act was entirely
practical and that theoretically it was an unenforceable statement of policy
by the forty-first Congress. Justice Thomas seems to want to lead the Court
in another direction, and his separate opinion in United States v. Lara 21
tried to give this Act some doctrinal importance. Be that as it may, or may
not be, practically speaking, treaty-making with the tribes has ended,
forever, one suspects, this being a development about which I am somewhat
ambivalent.22 Thus, in the international situation, an out-moded treaty can
be renegotiated, even where one of the original parties has now disappeared
from the international scene; Russia, for example, became the obligor and
beneficiary of treaties negotiated by the U.S.S.R. In Indian law, on the
other hand, we have the unique situation where, under McClanahan, the
tribal party to the treaty still exists, but under the Act of March 3, 1871, the
treaty may not be renegotiated with it.

19.
20.
21.
22.

McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172-73 (1973).
See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, c.120 § 1, 16 Stat. 566 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §71).
541 U.S. 193, 214 (Thomas, J., concurring) (2004).
See Robert Laurence, Antipodean Reflections on American Indian Law, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 533 (2003).
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XII.
“What is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered
the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty
rights on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the
treaty.”23
Commentary
What happened to Dion? Somewhere in the midst of the discussion of
the Dead and Living Hands, of the George Bushes, perè et fils, of promisekeeping and -breaking, I will ease Dion and the hunting of the National
Bird into the discussion, usually in response to an overly facile statement in
support of treaty rights by a student whom I guess to be an environmentalist. In the course of that discussion, I introduce the class to Chief
Billie’s confrontation with one of the last remaining Florida panthers, puma
concolor coryi, recounted in United States v. Billie.24 The complete versions of these two cases, the first to apply the quoted Dion test, become
reading assignments as the discussion of treaties continues. The Billie cases
are especially good for class discussion, both because of the glamour of the
animal at issue, and because of its virtual indistinguishability of the Florida
panther from the western cougar, puma concolor, of which there are many.

23. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986).
24. 667 F.Supp. 1485 (S.D. Fla. 1987). The State of Florida’s parallel prosecution is found
in State v. Billie, 497 So.2d 889 (Fla. App. 1986).
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XIII.
The First Graph
A

B

C

D

E

F

G

H

Proposition A: Lone Wolf is wrong and the federal courts should enjoin
the unilateral abrogation of Indian (and international?) treaties.
Proposition B: Lone Wolf is right, but Dion is wrong, and the federal
courts should require the intent to abrogate an Indian treaty to appear on the
face of the abrogating statute.
Proposition C: Dion is wrong, but United States v. White, 508 F.2d 453
(8th Cir. 1974), is right, i.e., the federal courts should require that the intent
to abrogate be found explicitly on the face of the statute or in the legislative
history.
Proposition D: Dion is right, but applies only to the Bald Eagle
Protection Act.
Proposition E: Dion is right, and applies beyond the Bald Eagle
Protection Act, but its application should only be extended carefully.
Proposition F: Dion is right and should be extended aggressively in
order to advance the worthy purposes of the various environmental statutes.
Thus, Billie is right, because of the worthiness of the abrogating statute, i.e.
the Endangered Species Act.
Proposition G: Dion is right, but Billie is wrong, because the
Endangered Species Act is not that important an environmental statute.
However, a really important statute like the Clean Water Act or the Clean
Air Act should be found to abrogate Indian treaties by implication.
Proposition H: Any later statute should abrogate a prior inconsistent
treaty.
Commentary following the First Chart:
After (usually) considerable struggle with Dion and the Billie cases, I
force the students to place themselves on the first chart above. Ordinarily
they spread themselves out quite nicely across the entire spectrum. (For
what it’s worth, after the students have committed themselves to a place on
the chart, I place myself at position C)
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XV.
“I want you to understand that you are absolutely dependent upon the
Great Father to-day for a living. Let the Government send out instructions
to your agent to cease to issue these rations, let the Government instruct
your agent to cease to issue your clothes. . . . Let the Government instruct
him to cease to issue your supplies, let him take away the money to run your
schools with, and I want to know what you would do. Everything you are
wearing and eating is gratuity. Take all this away and throw this people
wholly upon their own responsibility to take care of themselves, and what
would be the result? Not one-fourth of your people could live through the
winter, and when the grass grows again it would be nourished by the dust
of all the balance of your noble tribe.”25
XVI.
“Given the Tribe’s evident concern with reaffirmance of the
Government’s obligations under the 1858 Treaty, and the Commissioners’
tendency to wield the payments as an inducement to sign the agreement, we
conclude that the saving clause pertains to the continuance of annuities, not
the 1858 borders.”26
XVII.
“ ”27
Commentary
We end here, with two quotations and one non-quotation from the
Yankton Sioux case. We have Commissioner Cole’s extraordinarily bareknuckled (from a twenty-first century perspective) negotiation style. We
have Justice O’Connor’s pragmatic, if cold, use of Mr. Cole’s words. And
we have the words that were not written by any Justice: “I concur in the
result in this case, but write briefly and separately to comment on the
Court’s use of Commissioner Cole’s statement to the Yankton Sioux during
the winter of 1892, a time of deep, deep distress . . . .”
Mr. Ireson’s reformulation of the graph from a linear spectrum into an
ellipse is most clearly suggested by Commissioner Cole’s statement. As
25. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 522 U.S. 329, 346-47 (1998) (quoting Council of
the Yankton Indians (Dec. 10, 1892)).
26. Id. at 347. Justice O’Connor wrote for a unanimous Court.
27. Id. ( ____________, J., concurring in judgment).

808

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL . 82:795

Mr. Ireson put it: If the United States could then, and can now, impose a
“renegotiated” change in treaty obligations like that, then how, exactly, is
Proposition A different from Proposition H? How indeed?
Returning to the Yankton case, I ask the students this: which bothers
you more as a twenty-first century American—that Mr. Cole said such a
thing in 1892, or that Justice O’Connor used the quotation without batting
an eye in 1998? I suspect that if I were teaching the course just now, the
name of Benedict XVI would arise in the conversation: To what extent
would the quoting of Mr. Cole’s words serve “to begin a dialogue” with the
Indians?
Two Quotations in Conclusion
XVIII.
“Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.”
Emma Lazarus
“The New Colossus” (1883)
XIX.
“Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself.
(I am large, I contain multitudes.)”
Walt Whitman
“Song of Myself” in Leaves of Grass (1891)
Commentary: Thoughts after the Symposium
One leaves the North Dakota Symposium, both its live and printed
versions, optimistic about the pedagogy of American Indian law. The
Baker Court Room at U.N.D. was, and these pages in the North Dakota
Law Review are, full of ideas and energy. The relatively new professors,
especially, have brought, and are bringing, to the field new missions and
new enthusiasm, and—that much more remarkable—the earlier generation
of professors is showing itself willing both to lead the way and to accept the
offered innovations. The students of the future are a lucky bunch.
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As should have been expected, the Symposium did not—and could
not—separate pedagogy from theory, and most of the offerings, in Grand
Forks and here, are a nice mix to the two. (The present essay alone, perhaps, is pure pedagogy.) And it is entirely appropriate that two scholars of
generation-long standing stated most clearly, for me, the two doctrinal
issues for the next generation to tackle. First—actually second chronologically, but first logically—Professor Goldberg of UCLA raised the
fundamental question of when the rules with respect to Indian tribes should
be the same as those off-reservation, and when they should be different. I
took my shot at that question, to no great effect, in the article on symmetry
and asymmetry,28 but there is much, much more to be done. Perhaps most
difficult is this question: of what impact on the law—practical and doctrinal
impact—is the fact that most all Indian tribes are so very much smaller than
all states? How much nationhood can be expected from a county-sized
government? It is impossible to ignore this difference, in my view, though
it is not always the case that the difference makes a difference in the
outcome. It is exactly this question, very broadly put, that Professor
Goldberg set the next generation of scholars to work on.
Secondly, Professor Pommersheim, of the University of South Dakota,
asked as plainly as it has ever been asked: What is the perimeter of the
Plenary Power? Much of the scholarly work done so far, for good or ill, has
been pointed toward showing the illegitimacy of the Plenary Power, but,
without entirely abandoning that position, Professor Pommersheim still
noted that conceding the existence of the power does not concede its
infinity. Any constitutional power must have a perimeter and some hard
work should be put into finding it. I, who long ago confessed to being able
to live with the Plenary Power,29 must admit that I did not even try to
survey this perimeter, beyond noting that the power, if found in one place in
the Constitution, would be restricted by other places therein, a rather
elemental proposition ratified by the court in the Seminole Tribe case. 30
Beyond this, I don’t know, and admit that trying to explain Indian law
without figuring out the Plenary Power is a little like trying to explain the
physics of the universe while leaving out gravity.
But Professor
Pommersheim has set the issue before us and it’s time we tried our hands at
general relativity.

28. Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in Federal Indian Law, 42 ARIZ. L. REV.
861 (2000).
29. Robert Laurence, Learning to Live with the Plenary Power of Congress over the Indian
Nations, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 413 (1988).
30. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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Now, on closer examination, these two issues for the twenty-first
century merge, and Professor Pommersheim’s is seen to be but a special
case of Professor Goldberg’s. For there are Commerce Clauses in the
Constitution other than the Indian Commerce Clause, and they have both
established and emerging perimeters, as the Court has allowed, vel non,
over the years various acts of Congress. Thus, Professor Pommersheim’s
issue, stated in Professor Goldberg’s terminology, is whether the perimeter
of the Commerce Clause is the same for the tribes as it is for the states.
What, in the end, does “commerce with the Indian nations” mean? The new
scholars and teachers will need to be working there for some years to come,
a proposition that seems not to daunt them.
All-in-all, then, I am optimistic about Indian law in the years ahead,
both in the classroom and in the law journals. In the United States Reports?
Well, now, that’s another matter.

